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ASSIGNMENT OR SUBLETTING?
In an article of this short length it would be futile to attempt a reconciliation of the decisions relating to the
question posed by the title in transactions whereby a lessee
has transferred his interest in a lease. The writer will in
the main discuss a few of the decisions dealing with the
question in Georgia. Furthermore, as a necessary incident
to the problem of assignments and sublettings, some mention will be made of the effect Code§§ 6I-ioi et seq. and 858oi et seq. have on transactions involving assignments and
sublettings, and the importance of determining which section
is applicable to a particular situation. However, at the outset, a brief summary of the general law might prove heplful.
The general principle as held by all the authorities is
that, where the lessee transfers his whole interest in his
lease, without reserving to himself a reversion therein, a
privity of estate is at once established between the transferee
and the original landlord, and the latter then has a right of
action directly against the assignee on the covenants running
with the land; but if the lessee transfers the premises reserving or retaining any reversion, however small, the
privity of estate between the transferee and the original
lessor is not established and the latter has no right of action
against the former, there being neither privity of estate nor
privity of contract between them.' Reading the decisions on
this particular phase of the law emphasizes the fact that a
great deal of confusion can arise in the application of principles so apparently clear and unambiguous on their face.
"Unfortunately, these basic principles, so firmly entrenched,
so unfailingly reiterated in our law, are applied only to the
most obvious and simple situations."' Although the authorities are in harmony over what amounts to an assignment or subletting, that harmony is less evident where the
question is: when does the transaction amount to an assignment and when does it amount to a subletting? The distinc1. Sexton v. Chicago Storage Co., 129 Ill.
318, 21 N.E. 920, 16 Am.
St. Rep. 274 (1889).
2. Wallace, Assignment and Sublease, 8 IND L.J. 359, 360 (1933).
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tion is important due to the various rights, duties, and
liabilities the original lessor, lessee or transferee has respectively. The liability of the assignee rests in the privity
of estate with the lessor, and, as a result thereof, he reaps
the benefts of and is directly liable on the covenants that
run with the land? On the other hand, the sublessee is only
responsible to the original lessee in so far as his contractual
obligations go, and is in no way in privity of estate with the
original landlord.'
The decisions are fairly clear and consistent whenever
the lease contains a provision whereby the sublessee is to
surrender the premises to the original lessee before the
expiration date of the lease. The major conflict arises in
transactions where the lessee transfers his whole term away
but reserves the right to re-enter and gain possesion of the
premises after the breach of a condition subsequent.
According to one line of cases, represented perhaps best
by Davis v. V/idal,5 the courts hold that such a reservation
for re-entry on the breach of a condition subsequent amounts
to such a reversionary interest remaining in the sublessor
as to take the transaction out of the category of an assignment and instead, declare it to be a subletting. The Davis
case dealt with an action by a lessor against his lessee's
transferee to recover rent. The original lessor, Davis, had
leased the lot to the Dallas Brewing Company for a term
of three years at a monthly, rental of $ioo.oo. The lease
contained a provision allowing sublettings without the
lessor's consent. The Brewing Company then excuted an
agreement whereby it did "sublet, assign and transfer" the
original lease to one Vidal, the defendant. The latter transaction contained the usual clause for re-entry in case of default on the rental obligation. Thus, the question was
squarely presented as to whether the transaction was an
assignment or a subletting. If such amounted to an assign3. Stewart v. Long Island Railroad Co., 102 N.Y. 601, 8 N.E. 200,
55 Am. Rep. 844 (1886).
4. Davis v. Vidal, 105 Tex. 444, 151 S.W. 290, 42 L.R.A., N.S. 1084
(1912).
5. Ibid.
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ment, then Vidal would be liable. On the other hand, if it
was only a subletting, there was no privity of estate as

would be necessary for the maintenance of the action. As
mentioned before, the court interpreted the instrument as
a subletting and entered judgment for the defendant. The
theory of the cases in accord with the Davis case is that the
right of re-entry is in the nature of a contingent reversionary
interest and amounts to such a reversionary interest in the
property as to prevent the subtenant from getting the
whole term.
The other side of the question, as regards re-entry, is
clearly illustrated by the case of Sexton v. Chicago Storage
Company,7 considered to represent the majority view. This
case dealt with a lease given by the complainant to one Cole
for a period of three years. Later Cole leased the same
premises to the defendant for the balance of the term reserving a different rental and also the right of forfeiture
and re-entry for nonpayment of rent or other breaches of
its conditions. The lessee covenanted to surrender the premises to the lessor at the expiration of the lease or sooner if
determined by forfeiture. The lessor sued the transferee on
the theory that the transaction amounted to an assignment.
The trial court held that it was a subletting and an appellate
court affirmed. The supreme court reversed the holding
stating that the reservation of a right of re-entry for a condition broken did not amount to an estate in land and the
reservation of a new and different rental was immaterial.
The court in the Sexton case disposed of the theory that
such right of re-entry was an estate in land by saying that
the right to re-enter for such breach could not be alienated
as is the case with an estate in land. The right of re-entry
for a breach of condition subsequent is still but a remedy
for enforcing performance of a contract which may be
defeated by tender!
6. Dunlap v. Bullard, 131 Mass. 161 (1881), wherein a subletting of
the whole unexpired term of a lease with covenants whereby sub-

lessee agreed to pay taxes and also increased rental was held to
be a subletting only. This is the so-called Massachusetts rule.
7. Sexton v. Chicago Storage Co., slpra note 1.
8. TAYLOR, LANDLORD AND TENANT 302 (8th Ed.); Sexton v. Chicago Storage Co., supra note 1.
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"Such a right (i. e., to enter for breach of condition subsequent)
is not a reversion, nor is it an estate in land. It is a mere chose in
action and when enforced, the grantor is in by the forfeiture of
the condition and not by the reverter."'

The decisions holding the re-entry provision to be an
estate sufficient to preclude an assignment seem plainly contrary to the principles of the common law." Coke gave as
his reason for such inalienability of rights of re-entry for
breaches of conditions subsequent the fact that such was
for "avoiding of maintenance, supression of right, and stirring up of suits; and therefore nothing in action, entry or
' 77
re-entry can be granted over.
From this brief summary of some of the decisions it is
obvious that harmony is lacking in the courts whenever
they deal directly with the question of rights of re-entry.
Respectable authority can be found to support either view
mentioned above."i The situation in Georgia on this phase
of the law seems to be somewhat of a combination of both
widely divergent views." The view followed in Georgia has
been mentioned in several of the authorities cited and was
9. 1 WASHBURN, REAL PROPERTY 451, 474 (2nd Ed.).
10. In Sexton v. Chicago Storage Co., supra note 1, the court concluded that the rule as applied in the Dunlap case, supra note 6,
and which was relied on in the Sexton case was plainly contrary
to common law whether predicated on a local statute or not as
was suggested by the defendant.
11. Co. Litt. § 347 (214a).
12. In support of the Massachusetts rule that a reservation of a
right to re-enter amounts to an estate in land therefore making
transactions wherein it is contained a subletting and not an assignment, see Roberson v. Pioneer Gas Co., 173 La. 313, 137 So.
46, 82 A.L.R. 1264 (1931); Webb v. Jones, 88 Cal. App. 20, 263
Pac. 538 (1928) ; Collins v. Hasbrouck, 56 N.Y. 157, 15 Am. Rep.
407 (1874) ; Saling v. Flesch, 85 Mont. 106, 277 Pac. 612 (1929) ;
contra C.N.H.F. Inc. v. Eagle Crest Development Co., 99 Fla.
1238, 128 So. 844 (1930) ; Indian Refining Co. v. Roberts, 97 Ind.
App. 615, 181 N.E. 283 (1932) ; Gillette Bros., Inc. v. Aristocrat
Restaurant, Inc., 239 N.Y. 87, 145 N.E. 748 (1924), wherein the
court distinguishes some earlier New York cases to the contrary;
Moskin Stores, Inc. v. Nichols, 163 Va. 702, 177 S.E. 109 (1934);
Brummitt Tire Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 18 Tenn. App. 270,
75 S.W.2d 1022 (1934).
13. Potts-Thompson Liquor Co. v. Potts, 135 Ga. 451, 69 S.E. 734
(1910).
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a direct holding in the case of Stewart v.Long Island Railroad Company,'4 that is, whenever the lessee parts with his
whole term, reserving a right of re-entry for a breach of
condition subsequent, the transaction, as between the original
lessor and the transferee, amounts to an assignment, thus
establishing privity of estate; but as between the original
lessee and the transferee, the transaction is treated as a
subletting, if the parties so intended.'5 The Potts-Thompson
case involved a situation in which one Potts leased from
another certain premises for a term of five years at a monthly rental of $5oo.oo. Potts, the lessee, had the privilege of
subletting the whole or part of the premises. The PottsThompson Liquor Co. desired to sublet the premises and an
agreement to this effect was drawn between Potts and the
company. The company agreed to pay the $Soo.oo to the
original lessor and in addition agreed to pay to Potts individually an additional amount of $250.00 monthly. This sublease reserved the right to re-enter for condition broken. In
holding that the transaction, as between the original lessor
and the transferee, amounted to an assignment, but as between the original lessee and his transferee such amounted to
a subletting, the court adopted as it views the reasoning of
the Stewart case, supra.
The Stewart case proceeded on the theory that it is immaterial whether the assignor reserves to himself a different
or greater rental or whether the transaction is coupled with
a power of re-entry for non-payment of rent. There seems
to be no doubt that the effect of the transaction between the
original lessor and the transferee amounts to an assignment. However, in spite of this, the Potts-Thompson case,
in following the Stewart case, determines the effect between
the lessee and his sublessee by examining and respecting the
intention of the parties. By following the Stewart case Georgia seems to have settled the question of the effect of reentry rights when incorporated into a lease. "A right of
re-entry is not a reversion or estate in land. Nor is a mere
possibility of reverter for condition broken, which may or
14.
15.

Stewart v. Long Island Railroad Co., supra note 3.
Potts-Thompson Liquor Co. v. Potts, surpra note 13.
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may not happen, an estate in reversion."16 Furthermore, if
the Georgia courts accept fully the reasoning of the Stewart
case, as apparently has been done, they have acquiesced in
the view that it is immaterial whether a new and different
rental is reserved or whether technical words of demise or
the like appropriate to strict leases are used." Similar to
this reasoning some courts have held that it makes no difference if the transaction is in the form of a sublease; if the
effect of the transfer is to convey all the interest of the original lessee, it still amounts to an assignment."
Even in view of the peculiar situation in Georgia there
still seems to be no question of double liability on the part
of the sublessee. It is very doubtful that the courts could, in
a situation where neither the original lessor nor the sublessor
had been paid, hold the transferee liable for both the rent
due the original landlord by virtue of the privity of estate
and the rent due the sublessor by reason of the privity of
contract."'
16.

MITCHELL, REAL PROPERTY IN GEORGIA 155 (1945). See also Doe d.

Freeman v. Bateman, 2 B. & Aid. 167, 106 Eng. Rep. 328 (1818);
C.N.H.F., Inc. v. Eagle Crest Development Co., supra note 12;
Lawrence v. Mayor of Savannah, 71 Ga. 392 (1883), which seems
to hold that the right of re-entry is merely a security for the
payment of rent.
17. See further, Craig v. Summers, 47 Minn. 189, 49 N.W. 742, 15
L.R.A. 236 (1891), which follows the Sexton and Stewart cases,
notes 1 and 3 respectively, and further holds that a mere reservation of rent or right of re-entry for a breach of any of the conditions of the lease will not change the legal relations of the
parties, and the introduction of covenants into the instrument,
whatever may be their effect between the immediate parties
thereto, does not change the legal effect of giving up the reversion.
18. Johnson.v. Moxley, 216 Ala. 466, 113 So. 656 (1927). Also cited
in Johnson v. First National Bank, 53 Ga. App. 643, 187 S.E.
300 (1936), for the general proposition that the privity of estate
existing between the lessor and the transferee can be extinguished by a mere naked assignment.
19. In Wallace, supra note 2, at 374, the writer, dealing with the
proposition of possible double liability on the part of the transferee in cases where neither the lessor nor the original lessee
had been paid, cites Potts-Thompson Liquor Co. v. Potts, supra
note 13, as authority for the proposition that any amount paid
to the head lessor could be apparently deducted from any sum
due the lessee.
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A study of the problem of assignments and sublettings in
Georgia raises the interesting question of the effect of the
Code sections dealing with the landlord and tenant relationship and those dealing with the creation of an estate for
years.2 Although this question is different from the narrow
proposition of what amounts to an assignment and what
amounts to a subletting, the writer believes that the correct
determination of the applicable Code section is a necessary
incident to the problem under discussion. It is most important to determine under which Code section the lease is
drawn because an assignment or subletting of a lease for
less than five years under Code § 6I-ioi would be void unless given with the consent of the landlord, whereas an assignment or subletting under Code § 85-8oi is valid whether
given with the lessor's consent or not. Thus, an assignment
or subletting of a lease of less than five years without the
landlord's consent, would, under Code § 61-ioi render the
transferee a mere intruder subject to summary eviction.2"
20. GA. CODE § 61-101 (1933). "When the owner of real estate
grants to another simply the right to possess and enjoy the use
of such real estate, either for a fixed time or at the will of the
grantor, and the tenant accepts the grant, the relation of landlord and tenant exists between them. In such case no estate passes
out of the landlord, and the tenant has only a usufruct, which he
may not convey except by the landlord's consent and which is not
subject to levy and sale; and all renting or leasing or such real
estate for a period of time less than five years shall be held to
convey only the right to possess and enjoy such real estate, and
to pass no estate out of the landlord, and to give only the usufruct, unless the contrary shall be agreed upon by the parties to
the contract and so stated therein."
GA. CODE § 85-801 (1933). "An estate for years is one which
is limited in its duration to a period fixed or which may be
made fixed and certain. If it is in lands it passes as realty. It
may be for any number of years, provided the limitation is within
the rule against perpetuities."
21. McBurney v. McIntyre, 38 Ga. 262 (1868), wherein the court held
that the landlord could refuse to accept the subtenant as his
tenant and was authorized in any manner prescribd by law for
the expulsion of trespassers or intruders to oust the subtenant.
See also Stultz v. Fleming, 83 Ga. 14, 9 S.E. 1067 (1889), where
the court said that "where the tenancy of the storehouse occupied
by the assignors was by the year, they could not sublet the same
without the consent of their landlord. They had no estate in it."
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However if such conveyance between the original lessor and
his lessee created in the latter an estate for years, the holder
of that estate can assign or sublet as he see fit, subject of
course to the limited estate he has. 2 Hence, once it is determined that an assignment or subletting has taken place, the
validity of that transaction depends, in certain circumstances, under which Code section the original lease was
drawn. A brief discussion of a few of the Georgia cases
will point to the need of some sort of legislative clarification
of the question.
The intention of the parties seems to be the governing
factor in determining the applicability of Code § 6i-ioi or
Code § 85-8oi.
"Whether under a contract providing for the rent of land an
estate in the land passes to the tenant, or he obtains merely the
usufruct, and no estate in the land depends upon the intention
of the parties; and this is true without regard to the length of
the term. While under the Code, contracts of rental for terms less
than five years will generally be construted to give only the
usufruct and to pass no estate, still such contracts may have the
effect to pass an estate to the tenant where it is manifest from the
instrument containing the contract that such was the intention
of the parties.
"An estate for years is a contract for the possession of lands
or tenements for some determinable period, and this period may
be less than a year, as a certain number of months, or even
weeks."

2

In the case quoted from, the court refused to declare that
all leases for five years or longer created an estate for years

or that all leases for less than five years created only a mere
usufruct. Some light is cast on the question by the case of
To the same effect is Hudson v. Stewart, 110 Ga. 37, 35 S.E. 178
(1899); Bass v. West, 110 Ga. 698, 36 S.E. 244 (1900); Lawson
v. Haygood, 202 Ga. 501, 43 S.E.2d 649 (1947).
22. See Garner v. Byrd, 23 Ga. 289 (1857), wherein the court held
that a tenant has the right to assign his lease but he cannot
substitute another paymaster in his stead without the consent and
acceptance of the landlord. See further, Robinson v. Perry, 21
Ga. 183, 68 Am. Dec. 455 (1857).
23. Hutcheson v. Hodnett, 115 Ga. 990, 993, 994, 42 S.E. 422, 424
(1902).
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Dunlap v. George,2 which involved a lease for fifty years.
The court, by way of dictum, after stating the general rule
that privity of estate existed between the original lessor
and the last transferee, mentioned that the rule was to
the contrary where property is leased for less than five years
in which case no leasehold estate is created. The hesitancy
of the courts to hold flatly one way or another is explained
to some extent in a recent case 5 wherein the court said:
In disposing of the above quoted case, the court placed
particular emphasis on the lease provision whereby the
lessor assumed the responsibility of the upkeep of the
premises, the payment of taxes, insurance, etc. Under Code
§ 6I-ioi et seq. such obligations are imposed by law upon
the landlord, and the court evidently concluded that if the
parties intended to create in the lessee a mere usufruct, it
would have been unnecessary to mention them in the lease.
Another case along these lines which presents an interesting question and also a lengthy discussion of the effect
of long term leases is Georgia v. Davison.27 On the question of whether every renting or leasing of real estate
for a period of five years or more creates an estate for years
24. 48 Ga. App. 341, 172 S.E. 657 (1933).
25. Warehouses, Inc. v. Wetherbee, 203 Ga. 483, 46 S.E.2d 894 (1948).
"That this court has never intended to hold that a lease for 5
years or more is ipso facto and as a matter of law an estate for
years, is conclusively shown by numerous cases in which this
court has construed the terms of such a lease for the purpose of
determining whether or not the instrument by its express terms
or by the necessary implication of its terms did or did not limit
the interest passed to a mere usufruct."2
26. As to the applicability of Code § 61-101 to. leases of five years or
more, the court in Warehouses, Inc. v. Wethe*rbee, supra note 25,
at page 485 said, "As to leases for as much or more than five
years, the amendment to the Code, § 61-101, has no application,
and the rule of the common law would prevail so as to pass an
estate for years unless the agreement by its own terms, as is
authorized by the above-quoted Code section, cuts down the interest passed to a mere usufruct. Thus, if the express terms or
necessary implication of the words used in the agreement should
in fact so provide, the Code section requires that they be given
effect despite the rule of the common law to the contrary."
27. 198 Ga. 27, 31 S.E.2d 225 (1944).
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under Code § 6I-ioi, the court mentioned that there had
been several statements to that effect in the cases28 of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. Although there
may be a presumption that a lease for five years or more
conveys an estate for years, this fact alone does not conclusively show that an estate for years was created, however, some of the decided cases2" seem to have so held."
From this brief summary of a few of the Georgia cases
on the question of whether a transaction amounts to an
assignment or a subletting it is apparant that Georgia is in
accord with the general proposition that it is immaterial
whether a right of re-entry is reserved, or whether a new
and different rent is contracted for. Furthermore, it is immaterial whether technical words or demise are used. The
conclusion is that once the lessee parts with his whole term,
an assignment has taken place. However, the Georgia courts
have added a new angle to the transaction whereby the
lessee and the assignee are in privity of contract by virtue
of the landlord and tenant relationship existing between
them, if they so desire and intend it. Whether this construction of the transaction is more beneficial than would be
otherwise is not to be decided here. The fact remains that
with the power residing in the parties to a lease contract to
bind themselves as they see fit, it is apparently well grounded.
The other aspect of this problem, viz., effect of leases for
more than five years, is decidedly confused as evidenced by
28. Schofield v. Jones, 85 Ga. 816, 11 S.E. 1032 (1890) ; Anderson v.
Kokomo Rubber Co., 161 Ga. 842, 132 S.E. 76 (1926); Harms v.
Entelman, supra note 29; Jones v. Fuller, 27 Ga. App. 84, 107
S.E. 544 (1921) ; Dunlap v. George, supra note 24; Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Stallings, 51 Ga. App. 351, 180 S.E. 654 (1935).
29. Collier v. Hyatt, 110 Ga. 317, 35 S.E. 271 (1899), wherein the
court in construing a particular lease contract for five years,
held that under the terms of such contract the tenant had the
mere use of the premises. See also Griffith v. Smith, 155 Ga. 717,
118 S.E. 194 (1923) ; Johnson v. Brice, 151 Ga. 472, 107 S.E. 338
(1921), wherein the court held a lease for 15 years did not create

an estate for years.
30. Midtown Chain Hotel Co. v. Bender, 77 Ga. App. 723, 49 S.E.2d

779 (1948).
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the cases. Some leases for more than five years create landlord and tenant relationships, whereas, other leases for
less than five years create estates for years. This uncertainty
in the law conclusively shows the need for some sort of
legislative clarification. As readily seen the amendment to
Code § 6i-ioi as regards the five year limitation and the
portion thereof giving the intention of the parties controlling weight has led to unlimited confusion. Possibly the legislature could remedy such a confused situation, which in one
way or another affects everyday transactions, by providing
that all leases for five years or more shall be construed as
conveying an estate for years unless it is specifically provided
otherwise. That would make it perfectly clear which Code
section was applicable. As regards Code § 6i-ioi, the
legislature could eliminate most of the confusion by providing that all leases for less than five years shall be construed
as coming under Code § 6i-ioi Iet seq. and thereby granting
only a usufruct, unless it is specifically provided within the
lease itself that such lease was to be construed according to
the rules of the common law.
"Under our system, the law of property should be fixed
and certain."'"
JOSEPH

31.
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